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Abstract
Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit 
biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces 
a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a 
skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her 
argument fails.
In section I, I explain Saul’s argument from implicit bias to skepticism. 
In section II, I advance the above-mentioned dilemma.
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Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit 
biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul 
faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not 
yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; 
thus, her argument fails.
In section I, I explain Saul’s argument from implicit bias to skepti-
cism. In section II, I advance the above-mentioned dilemma.
1 Saul’s argument from implicit bias to skepticism
For clarity, I have reconstructed Saul’s argument in premise-conclu-
sion form. It runs as follows:
(1) human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit biases.
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(2) if human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit bi-
ases, then we should be skeptical about the reliability of our 
rational faculties.
(3) thus, we should be skeptical about the reliability of our ratio-
nal faculties (2, 1).
With the argument outlined, I explain Saul’s defense of each premise.1
(1) human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit biases.
As Saul defines them, implicit biases “are largely unconscious… [and] 
automatic tendencies to associate certain traits with members of par-
ticular social groups” (Saul 2012: 244). Specifically, these biases tend 
to make us “judge members of stigmatized groups more negatively” 
(Saul 2012: 244). As Saul (2012: 244–5) argues, the psychological 
literature on this topic shows that our faculties are heavily influenced 
by implicit biases. She points to several key areas in which research 
has shown our faculties are infected with bias. Studies have shown 
that the perceived racial identities of names on otherwise equal CVs 
cause us to judge them differently, that the prestige of a scholar’s 
institution heavily influences the probability of favorable responses 
from journals, and that our perceptions of identical situations are 
likely to be altered by the racial identity of the people in them. This 
list is not exhaustive of the ways in which our faculties are influenced 
by implicit biases; rather, Saul intends this list to be a small sample of a 
broader phenomenon. Given all of this, Saul claims that our faculties 
are pervasively affected by the influence of implicit biases.
(2) if human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit bi-
ases, then we should be skeptical about the reliability of our 
rational faculties.
Saul gives a two-step argument in defense of premise 2; first, she 
argues that the evidence about implicit biases should make us skepti-
cal about our beliefs that come from individuals within marginal-
1 The reader should know in advance that I will be extensively quoting from 
the text; as I will show later in this paper, Saul’s argument, at several points, is 
ambiguous; by using her exact words whenever possible, I will reduce the chance 
of misconstruing her argument.
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ized groups; second, she argues that this skepticism about beliefs that 
come from individuals from marginalized groups entails a broader 
skepticism about the reliability of our rational faculties.
First, Saul holds that evidence about implicit biases should make 
us skeptical about our beliefs that come from marginalized individu-
als. As she argues, there is evidence that, when we think that the per-
son giving an argument or testimony is from a marginalized group, 
our biases make us more likely to negatively appraise this individual’s 
statements. From this, Saul infers that we should be skeptical about 
our beliefs that come from marginalized individuals. As she says:
We have very good reason to suppose that we are systematically making 
errors caused by our unconscious biases related to social categories (Saul 
2012: 250, emphasis added). 
My claim is that we’re likely to be making errors…It’s not that we’re likely 
to get some really difficult technical bits wrong, or that we’re likely 
to get things wrong if we’re really exhausted…we’re likely to let the 
social identity of the person making an argument affect our evaluation 
of that argument (Saul 2012: 249, emphasis added).
In these passages, Saul states that the influence of implicit bias shows 
that we are likely making errors whenever we evaluate a statement 
from a person in a marginalized group. To make an error in assessing 
these statements does not mean that we are slightly off the mark; 
rather, to be in error means that our beliefs (in this domain) are likely 
unjustified. As Louise Antony says, according to Saul, “the data about 
implicit bias tell us that, at least in certain domains, it is likely that 
we are not warranted in believing what we believe” (Antony 2016: 
258). From all of this, Saul concludes that we should be skeptical 
about our beliefs that come from marginalized individuals.
Saul then claims that this local form of skepticism has global im-
plications. As she argues, the fact that we are biased toward people 
from marginalized groups entails that we should endorse a more 
global, skepticism.
Before continuing, it is important to make an exegetical point. 
Saul’s argument is ambiguous; at points, it appears to be an argu-
ment for a more global skepticism, and at points it appears to be an 
argument for a more local skepticism. For example, at one point she 
claims that her argument does not entail that “we might be mistaken 
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about everything, or even everything in the external world...but it 
does mean that we have good reason to believe that we are mistaken 
about a great deal” (Saul 2012: 243). This passage suggests that she 
does not intend to endorse a global form of skepticism. However, I 
argue that, overall, the textual evidence points in favor of reading 
Saul as endorsing the more global option.2 And, I am not alone in this 
interpretation. Michael Brownstein clearly shares my interpretation; 
as he says:
Some have suggested that the facts about implicit bias warrant a ‘glob-
al’ skepticism toward our capacities as epistemic agents (Saul 2012).
(Brownstein 2017).3
Additionally, my interpretation is echoed by Duncan Pritchard and 
A. John Carter:
Saul’s route from observations about implicit bias to a form of scepticism 
about knowledge proceeds by first noting that facts about implicit biases 
show that ‘we have very good reason to suppose that we are systemati-
cally making errors caused by our unconscious biases related to social 
categories’ (Saul 2013a, 250). If such judgements related to social cat-
egories were rare, then this would motivate only a very localized form 
of scepticism about knowledge. According to Saul, however, such judge-
ments are widespread…one pervasive such arena is that of testimony…
what goes for our assessments of testimony applies mutatis mutandis to 
other social-epistemic activities, such as considering questions, judging 
arguments, listening to contributions, and so on. It thus follows that 
Saul has potentially identified an empirical basis for scepticism about a 
reasonably wide class of knowledge (Pritchard and Carter 2016).
And, Saul herself strongly indicates that she endorses a more global 
form of skepticism. As she argues, this bias-induced skepticism en-
tails that we cannot trust our faculties:
2 One might object that, for Saul, the skepticism ends here and does not gen-
eralize to other domains. In other words, one might argue that Saul’s skepticism 
is only intended to be about beliefs formed in certain social domains (i.e. in refer-
ence to marginalized individuals) and that this skepticism does not generalize to 
our cognitive faculties in general. Based on the evidence from the text that I cite 
in the coming pages, I argue that Saul does view her skepticism as generalizing 
from the social domain to all other domains.
3 Brownstein 2017.
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What we know about implicit biases shows us that we have very good 
reason to believe that we cannot properly trust our knowledge-seeking 
faculties ( Saul 2012: 243).
We are making errors in perception due to implicit bias. The very data 
from which we begin in thinking about the world-our perceptions-
cannot be relied upon to be free of bias (Saul 2012: 249).
Additionally, Saul’s skepticism entails that we should be skeptical 
about our abilities as seekers of truth:
The literature on implicit bias shows us…that we really should not 
trust ourselves as inquirers (Saul 2012: 253).
The literature on implicit bias shows us not just that our habits can’t be 
relied on to lead us to truth, but also that…they are likely to be based 
in values that we…find repugnant. It is difficult to see how we could 
ever properly trust these [our cognitive habits] again once we have re-
flected on implicit bias (Saul 2012: 254).
Simply put, Saul’s skepticism about beliefs from marginalized indi-
viduals entails a much more global skepticism about both our facul-
ties and our rational abilities. If this is not evidence enough, Saul’s 
claims about the implications of her view clearly indicate that she 
endorses a more global skepticism:
Much of our knowledge comes from testimony, or from arguments or 
evidence that we are presented with. Those testifying, or presenting 
are generally (though not always) perceived by us as members of social 
groups. Moreover, much of the knowledge we already have has come 
to us in this way. Our acceptance or rejection of testimony, arguments, 
evidence and the like has shaped the worldviews we have now. And this 
acceptance or rejection was, we can be fairly certain, distorted by the 
perceived social groups of those presenting the testimony, arguments 
or evidence (Saul 2012: 251).
It [the doubt from bias] is broad in its scope. It arises with regard to any 
beliefs that might have been unconsciously shaped by our implicit at-
titudes about members of social categories, and these are an enormous 
number of our beliefs. Moreover, we don’t in general even know which 
beliefs these are. This gives it the kind of breadth that leads to a much 
greater worry than the very containable concerns about probabilistic 
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reasoning (Saul 2012: 252–3).
Many of our philosophical beliefs-those beliefs we take to have been 
arrived at through the most careful exercise of reason-are likely to be 
wrong (Saul 2012: 247).
We have very good reason to suppose that we are systematically mak-
ing errors caused by our unconscious biases related to social categories 
(Saul 2012: 250).
Given all of this, it is clear that Saul does, in fact, endorse a more 
global skepticism.4 And, with that, her argument for premise 2 is 
complete. And, the conclusion follows:
(3) thus, we should be skeptical about the reliability of our ratio-
nal faculties (2, 1).
4 One might wonder, precisely, how global Saul’s skepticism is. For example, 
she says the following in reference to her argument: “this does not mean that we 
might be mistaken about everything, or even everything in the external world...
but it does mean that we have good reason to believe that we are mistaken about a 
great deal” (Saul 2012: 243). As I have stated previously, this passage suggests that 
there is some ambiguity in what Saul’s position is; she may be claiming (1) that we 
should be skeptical about all of our beliefs or that (2) we should be skeptical about 
most, but not all, of our beliefs. The passage just quoted seems to suggest that 
we should interpret Saul along the lines of (2). If this is true, then Saul does not 
endorse a fully global skepticism. I have several responses to this line of reasoning. 
First, the majority of the textual evidence (cited previously) suggests that Saul en-
dorses (1). Second, as a helpful referee comment made clear to me, Saul’s view not 
only calls into question many of our beliefs, but it also holds that we cannot know 
which of our beliefs have been called into question, as any individual belief could 
have been influenced by bias. As a result, Saul’s view entails that we cannot know 
which of our beliefs are biased, which means that we ought to regard all of them as 
being biased. In other words, if I know that many of my beliefs are unjustified due 
to the influence of implicit biases, and if I do not know which beliefs those are, 
this gives me a reason to distrust all of my beliefs (2012: 252–3). In that manner, 
Saul is committed to (1). Third, even if Saul is endorsing (2) rather than (1) my 
argument would still succeed. Saul very clearly indicates that she thinks our facul-
ties, our abilities as inquirers, and our intellectual habits are unreliable. So long 
as she claims this, my argument still succeeds, because these are the very belief 
forming mechanisms that she must use in order to develop her argument, which 
renders her position vulnerable to the self-defeat objection. So, even if some of 
our beliefs are not defeated by our biases, this would not affect my argument.
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One might ask if this skeptical problem could be avoided by bias re-
duction techniques. If that were true, then the skeptical conclusion 
of (3) could be avoided. On Saul’s view, this is not a promising route 
of objection. Saul does discuss how we can work to make ourselves 
less biased. But, there are two important things to notice about the 
bias reduction methods that Saul mentions: (1) they are only forward 
looking, and (2) they have only a minimal chance of success. First, 
Saul acknowledges that the bias reduction methods referenced in her 
paper can only help us to become less biased in the future; these 
methods cannot tell us if our currently held beliefs are influenced by 
bias. As she asks, “so is there anything that one can do? Not for past 
cases like these. However, I can act so as to reduce the likelihood of 
this happening in future instances” (Saul 2012: 257). Second, as Saul 
explains them, these bias reduction techniques will only be success-
ful if society changes in highly unlikely ways. As she says, “the only 
way to be fully freed from the grip of bias-related doubt is to create a 
social world where the stereotypes that now warp our judgments no 
longer hold sway over us” (Saul 2012: 260–1). As this is not likely to 
happen soon, Saul’s skepticism is likely to persist.
2 A dilemma for Saul
I argue that Saul’s view faces a dilemma: (1) if Saul’s argument is 
strong enough to generate skepticism, then it is self-defeating, or (2) 
if her argument is weak enough to not entail self-defeat, then it does 
not get her to a skeptical conclusion. Thus, Saul is either committed 
to a self-defeating position, or she is no longer arguing for a form of 
skepticism; either way, her skeptical conclusion fails.
2(a) Horn 1 of the dilemma
If Saul’s argument is strong enough to generate skepticism, then it is 
self-defeating.5 Saul’s argument arrives at a skeptical conclusion by 
calling into question the reliability of our rational faculties and abili-
5 I am aware that self-defeat objections are often advanced against skepticism. 
However, what is new about my argument is that it shows that an old objection is 
still successful against a new form of skepticism.
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ties as inquirers (henceforth ‘faculties’). If her argument succeeds, 
then it shows us that our faculties are generally unreliable. However, 
the very same rational faculties that Saul’s argument calls into ques-
tion are necessary in order for her to formulate her argument. In oth-
er words, to argue for skepticism about our rational faculties, Saul 
inevitably must use the very faculties that her argument is meant to 
impugn. After all, to acquire the empirical evidence about implicit 
biases that she uses in her argument, Saul must have used her percep-
tual faculties to read psychology articles, she must have accepted the 
testimony of psychologists, and she must have trusted her abilities as 
a seeker of truth. Thus, to have learned the empirical information 
used in her argument, Saul used her perception, relied on testimony, 
and trusted her rational abilities, all of which are called into ques-
tion by her argument. By her own reasoning, she should doubt the 
evidence used in her argument, because it was acquired using facul-
ties and abilities that she believes to be unreliable. Furthermore, the 
psychologists that Saul cites must have, in the process of conducting 
their research, relied on the testimony of participants in their stud-
ies, must have used their perceptual faculties to make observations, 
etc. Essentially, for Saul to have acquired the empirical information 
used in her argument, and in order for the researchers Saul cites to 
have acquired their data, testimony, perception, and other faculties 
must have been relied on. In short, both Saul and the researchers 
that she cites must have relied on their faculties in order to formulate 
their arguments and conduct their research. Yet, Saul’s argument 
is meant to generate a skeptical conclusion about the reliability of 
these very faculties. Again, she argues that “what we know about 
implicit biases shows us that we have very good reason to believe 
that we cannot properly trust our knowledge-seeking faculties” (Saul 
2012: 243). This leads to a clear self-defeat problem: if we agree with 
Saul’s conclusion (that we cannot trust our faculties and should be 
skeptical about the beliefs that they generate), then we must doubt 
her conclusion, because it relies on those very faculties. In so far 
as self-defeating arguments impugn themselves and are incoherent, 
we should not be troubled by them. Thus, if Saul’s argument entails 
skepticism, then it fails.
One might object to this line of reasoning in several ways. For the rest 
of this section, I consider several objections to my self-defeat argument.
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Objection 1:
First, the objector might argue that there is something sophistical 
and, so to speak, suspicious, about this argument; it seems to use 
a trick in reasoning in order to conclude that we should not worry 
at all about the influence of implicit biases on our faculties. And, as 
the objector holds, this seems too easy, and it discards the very real 
influence of implicit biases on our beliefs.
In response, I argue that this objection rests on a misunderstand-
ing of my argument. The objector is correct that this self-defeat 
problem is not sufficient grounds to ignore our biases altogether; 
but, that is not my claim. Rather, my claim is simply that, if Saul’s 
argument generates a genuine form of skepticism, then it is self-de-
feating. As will be seen in the next section, Saul can reformulate her 
argument to avoid this self-defeat objection while still taking very 
seriously the epistemic threat posed to our beliefs by implicit biases. 
Essentially, accepting my self-defeat objection does not license one 
to simply discard the evidence from the implicit bias literature; my 
argument is only meant to show that this evidence cannot generate 
skepticism without entailing self-defeat.
Objection 2:
Second, one might object that Saul can avoid this self-defeat problem 
if she were to use the aforementioned bias-reduction techniques on 
herself. In short, if Saul could use these methods to reduce her own 
biases, then she could advance her argument without defeating her-
self, as her own faculties would not be unreliable.6
I have several responses to this objection. First, Saul herself ex-
presses strong doubts about the efficacy of these bias reduction tech-
niques. As I stated earlier, Saul argues that these strategies are only 
forward looking, meaning that they cannot help us to remove the 
influence of bias from beliefs we have formed in the past (2012: 257). 
And, she also argues that these strategies have a minimal chance of 
success (2012: 260–1). Given this, it seems that bias reduction tech-
niques do not help Saul to escape the self-defeat objection, as she 
herself does not put much trust in these techniques.
6 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection, as well as 
objection 3.
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Second, even if Saul could successfully implement these bias re-
duction strategies on herself, this would still not allow her to escape 
the self-defeat objection. The psychologists who Saul cites in defense 
of her argument, like all humans, are biased. So, unless Saul has 
evidence that the majority of the psychologists she cites have con-
ducted extensive bias reduction routines on themselves, the data that 
she uses to form her argument would still be biased. Thus, even if 
Saul could reduce her own biases when conducting research, the 
very evidence that she draws from is likely to be infected by biases. 
This means that she still faces the self-defeat objection, because the 
empirical evidence that she uses to justify her skepticism about the 
reliability of our faculties would, itself, be generated by the facul-
ties of individuals who are biased. So, even if Saul is unbiased, she 
still argues that we should not trust our faculties based on evidence 
that comes from the same faculties that she has called into question, 
namely the faculties of people in general.
Objection 3:
Third, one might object with a dilemma; either one of the follow-
ing is true: (1) if Saul was biased when she conducted her research 
and formed her argument, then her conclusion is correct, namely 
that our faculties are biased and cannot be trusted, or (2) if Saul was 
not biased when she conducted her research, then she has correctly 
inferred her conclusion from the evidence. Either way, argues the 
objector, Saul’s conclusion (that our faculties are biased and thus un-
reliable) follows without self-defeat.
If (2) is correct, then Saul could justifiably infer that our facul-
ties are biased. After all, she would be using empirical evidence to 
justify her belief, and she would have no reason to distrust this evi-
dence. However, as I have argued, option (2) is, in fact, not the case. 
Saul’s argument calls into question the very faculties that she used to 
form this argument; in that manner, her argument and her research 
are affected by bias-related skepticism. This leaves option (1). How-
ever, this option does not justify Saul’s conclusion. It may turn out 
to be the case that we are all heavily affected by implicit biases, but if 
our only evidence in support of this claim is defeated, then we can-
not justifiably believe that we are biased. For example, it may very 
well be the case that anti-realism about the external world is true. 
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However, if it turns out that anti-realism about the external world is 
self-defeating, we would lack justification for believing in this view, 
even if it is true. Saul’s view is analogous to this. Under option (1), 
it may be true that we are all heavily biased, but Saul would have no 
justification for holding this belief. Thus, I conclude that the objec-
tor’s dilemma fails, because option (2) is not the case, and because 
option (1) does not yield Saul’s desired conclusion.
2(b) Horn 2 of the dilemma
If Saul wants to avoid this self-defeat objection, then she can modify 
her argument so that it entails a significant, but non-skeptical, credence 
reduction in the reliability of our faculties. After all, if her argument 
claimed that we should significantly reduce our credences in many 
of our beliefs without reaching a skeptical (0.5) credence in these be-
liefs, then the self-defeat objection would not apply.7 The self-defeat 
objection only applies to her argument if she claims that we cannot 
trust our faculties; if she instead claims that we should significantly 
decrease our confidence (without being skeptical) about these facul-
ties, then her argument is not self-defeating. She can, without defeat-
ing herself, use her faculties in order to conclude that that we should 
lower our confidence in these very faculties. This position, as I see 
it, avoids self-defeat. For example, suppose that I have a 0.8 credence 
in P (‘my faculties are reliable’); if Saul’s argument concludes that I 
should reduce my credence in P by 0.20 (a non-trivial amount), then 
I would arrive at a 0.6 credence in P. This is a less confident attitude 
toward P, but it is not a skeptical position. This line of reasoning is 
not self-defeating. Thus, if Saul revised her argument in this way, she 
could avoid the self-defeat objection.
However, if Saul modifies her argument in this manner, then 
she faces the second horn of the dilemma: if her argument is weak 
enough to not entail self-defeat, then it does not entail skepticism. 
Thus, if Saul modifies her position in this way, then she can no longer 
7 There is disagreement about, precisely, what credence constitutes skepti-
cism or suspension of belief. For the sake of clarity, I will stipulate that a credence 
of 0.5 or below in P is skepticism about P and that anything above 0.5 in P consti-
tutes belief, however weak, in P.
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argue for a form of skepticism. 
Saul’s revised argument would run as follows (with the changes 
from the original premises italicized). Premise (1) would remain the 
same:
(1) human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit biases.
Premise (2), however, would have to be the following:
(2*) if human rational faculties are heavily affected by implicit bi-
ases, then we should significantly reduce our confidence in the 
reliability of our rational faculties (without becoming skeptical 
about our faculties).
It is important to note that claim (3) of Saul’s original argument 
does not follow from (2*) and (1). Saul’s original 3 concludes that 
we should be skeptical about the reliability of our rational faculties. 
Simply put, from the claim that we should be less confident in our 
faculties, it does not follow that we should be skeptical about our 
faculties. Rather, (3*) follows from (1) and (2*):
(3*) thus, we should significantly reduce our confidence in the reli-
ability of our rational faculties (without becoming skeptical about 
our faculties) (2*, 1).
To review, if Saul alters her position and claims that the influence of 
implicit biases entails a non-skeptical credence reduction in the reli-
ability of our faculties, then she must endorse (2*) rather than (2). 
From (1) and (2*), (3*) (not Saul’s original claim (3)) follows. Clearly, 
this revised argument does not reach a skeptical conclusion. At best, 
this revised argument mandates that we should reduce our credences 
in many of our beliefs, but it does not require us to be skeptical about 
our beliefs.
Conclusion
In total, Saul’s argument is either strong enough to entail skepticism, 
in which case it is self-defeating, or her argument is weak enough to 
avoid self-defeat, in which case it no longer entails skepticism. Thus, 
Saul’s argument cannot generate a skeptical conclusion. From this, I 
conclude that Saulish skepticism fails to be a plausible form of skepti-
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cism. Ultimately, this may be good news for Saul. If I am correct, 
then her argument cannot entail skepticism, but it can still entail a 
significant amount of confidence reduction in many of our beliefs. In 
that manner, my argument shows that Saul’s position is much stron-
ger if she endorses a less radical conclusion.8
Samuel Director
University of Colorado, Boulder
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